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Future nuclear arms reduction efforts will require technologies to verify that warheads
slated for dismantlement are authentic without revealing any sensitive weapons design infor-
mation to international inspectors. Despite several decades of research, no technology has
met these requirements simultaneously. Recent work by Kemp et al. [Kemp RS, Danagoulian
A, Macdonald RR, Vavrek JR (2016) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 113:8618–8623] has produced
a novel physical cryptographic verification protocol that approaches this treaty verification
problem by exploiting the isotope-specific nature of nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF)
measurements to verify the authenticity of a warhead. To protect sensitive information, the
NRF signal from the warhead is convolved with that of an encryption foil that contains key
warhead isotopes in amounts unknown to the inspector. The convolved spectrum from a
candidate warhead is statistically compared against that from an authenticated template
warhead to determine whether the candidate itself is authentic. Here we report on recent
proof-of-concept warhead verification experiments conducted at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. Using high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, we measured NRF spec-
tra from the interrogation of proxy ‘genuine’ and ‘hoax’ objects by a 2.52 MeV endpoint
bremsstrahlung beam. The observed differences in NRF intensities near 2.2 MeV indicate
that the physical cryptographic protocol can distinguish between proxy genuine and hoax
objects with high confidence in realistic measurement times.
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2Nuclear arms reduction treaties have traditionally suffered from the disarmament verification problem:
how can one confidently identify a warhead as authentic without having access to any sensitive design
information that proves it is authentic? Rather than confront this apparent paradox, treaties such as
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) have relied on verification of warhead deliv-
ery vehicles—e.g., missiles and bomber aircraft—rather than direct verification of warheads themselves.
Future arms control agreements, however, may require some mechanism for the verification of individual
warheads [1–4] to ensure that a country does not dispose of fraudulent or ‘hoax’ warheads in a gambit to
obtain a strategic nuclear advantage.
WARHEAD VERIFICATION
In a warhead verification protocol, a warhead owner (‘host’) attempts to prove to an inspection team
(‘inspector’) that an object submitted for inspection and subsequent dismantlement and disposition is
indeed a genuine nuclear warhead. An object successfully verified may then be dismantled by the host
under a secure chain of custody [5] and counted towards the host’s obligations under an arms reduction
treaty. At the same time, the host seeks to prevent the inspector from learning any sensitive informa-
tion about the design of the warhead, whether to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons technology
or disclosure of warhead architecture and vulnerabilities. Thus, the verification measurement must be
designed and performed in such a way as to provide a strong test of authenticity while while minimizing
intrusiveness and maximizing information security. Non-authentic warheads (‘hoaxes’) fall into two broad
categories: isotopic hoaxes, in which a valuable weapon component (e.g., the weapons-grade Pu fissile
fuel) is replaced by a less-valuable surrogate of similar geometry (e.g., reactor grade Pu); and geometric
hoaxes, in which isotopes are present in their correct amounts but in a non-weapons-usable configuration
(e.g., rough slabs of Pu rather than highly-engineered spherical shells).
Past approaches to warhead verification have generally focused on the ‘attribute’ approach, in which
the protocol measures a set of key characteristics thought to define a warhead, such as the total mass of
plutonium and the isotopic ratio of Pu-239 to Pu-240 in the object [6]. Such measurements are highly
intrusive, and so are conducted behind an ‘information barrier’ (IB), an electronic or software layer that
shields the classified raw measurement data and presents the inspector with only a binary pass/fail answer
for each of the attribute measurements [7]. However, certifying that an electronic or (especially) software
IB does not contain any hidden backdoors or functionalities—which a nefarious inspector could exploit
to obtain sensitive information or a nefarious host could use to fraudulently simulate a ‘genuine’ result—
is exceedingly difficult, and may never be satisfactorily proven. Moreover, attributes must be chosen
specifically to describe real nuclear warheads, and thus may constitute sensitive information themselves.
3Even then, the set of attributes may not be complete, opening the door to hoax objects that pass all the
attribute tests but nevertheless are not real warheads.
More recent work has therefore focused on the ‘template’ approach to verification, in which comparison
to a known genuine object (the “template”) is used to certify subsequent objects presented for inspec-
tion [4, 8, 9]. In such a protocol, the measurements of both the template and subsequent objects are
encrypted using the same method, so that only the encrypted signals (or “hashes”) must be compared to
authenticate. The hash should be unique to a particular combination of geometry and isotopic makeup
(i.e., a particular warhead design), while containing no sensitive information about the object. As such,
the hash is useless on its own, and only has any use in comparison against the hash of another object—a
warhead that is already known to be genuine. This authenticated template warhead could be established
for instance via an unannounced visit by the inspector to a random launch facility in the host country,
and then by selecting a random warhead from an active-duty intercontinental ballistic missile.1 A mea-
surement of the authenticated template would then be used as the standard against which to compare
the measurements from the same model of warhead covered by the arms control treaty.
Recent papers have put forth template verification protocols that aim to make a verification measure-
ment of a warhead while protecting sensitive design information. A team of researchers at Princeton
proposed and later experimentally demonstrated a verification protocol using superheated bubble detec-
tors and fast neutron radiography [10, 11]. In parallel, a team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) developed an alternative approach using isotopic tomography via transmission nuclear resonance
fluorescence (tNRF) [12]; the present work is an experimental demonstration of the MIT tNRF protocol.
Further techniques using coded-aperture-based passive neutron counters [13] and epithermal neutron res-
onance radiography [14], from Sandia National Laboratories and MIT, respectively, have been proposed
in the past year.
The strengths and weaknesses of the aforementioned proposals can be compared by examining the
three requirements of an ideal warhead verification protocol:
1. completeness: the ideal protocol must clear all real warheads;
2. soundness: the ideal protocol must raise an alarm on all hoax warheads;
3. information security: the ideal protocol must be zero-knowledge [15, 16]—for an honest host, it
must not reveal anything beyond a binary genuine/hoax determination.
1 In any template warhead verification protocol, the utility of every measurement hinges on the authenticity of the template.
A complete solution to the question of first establishing such an authentic template will require classified knowledge of the
chain of custody of a country’s nuclear stockpile, and therefore is an open question beyond the scope of this article.
4The Princeton protocol is essentially zero-knowledge, returning a flat image (up to statistical variation) if
the host has submitted a real warhead. In its original form [10], the measurement faces a challenge in the
soundness requirement: fast neutron radiography is insensitive to the isotopic or (in some cases) elemental
composition of the object, and cannot on its own distinguish between weapon materials and well-chosen
hoax materials. Additional measurement modes using multiple incident neutron energies [17] have been
proposed to increase the protocol’s discrimination between fissionable and fissile isotopes. Similarly, work
on the Sandia coded-aperture protocol has focused on satisfying the completeness and information security
aspects of the problem, but has not demonstrated resistance to hoaxing by a neutron source of similar
geometry and activity.
Unlike the Princeton and Sandia protocols, the two MIT protocols are highly sensitive to isotopics
through their use of isotope-specific resonant phenomena, making them highly robust against a large
class of hoaxes. While the MIT tNRF protocol is not zero-knowledge (since the inspector has access to
the hashed measurements rather than solely a binary genuine/hoax determination), and thus there are
uncertainties about the extent of the information security of the MIT tNRF protocol, there are methods to
make it sufficiently secure [12]. This work demonstrates the core measurement of the MIT tNRF protocol,
and is an experimental implementation of an isotopically-sensitive warhead verification measurement.
NUCLEAR RESONANCE FLUORESCENCE MEASUREMENTS
Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) describes the X(γ, γ′)X reaction in which a photon γ is reso-
nantly absorbed by the nucleus X and then re-emitted as the excited nucleus subsequently transitions
to its ground state [18, 19]. The cross section for an NRF interaction with absorption via the resonant
energy level Er is given by the Breit-Wigner distribution
σNRFr (E) = pigr
(
~c
Er
)2 ΓrΓr,0
(E − Er)2 + (Γr/2)2 (1)
where Γr is the width of the level at Er, Γr,0 is the partial width for transitions between Er and the ground
state, and gr is a statistical factor as described in SI Appendix §S1. For high-Z isotopes of interest, these
fundamental widths are typically ∼10 meV but the effective width of the cross section is increased to
∼1 eV through Doppler broadening by thermal motion of the target nuclei. Imperfect detector resolution
further broadens the measurable NRF resolution to widths of ∼1 keV. Since the NRF lines of an isotope
are still typically >10 keV apart, the set of resonance energies Er provides a resolvable, one-to-one map
between measurement space and isotopic space.
The MIT verification protocol exploits the isotope-specific nature of NRF to make a template measure-
ment of the mass and geometry of the isotopes of interest to the inspector. As discussed in the following
5section and illustrated in Fig. 1, the measurement uses a broad-spectrum bremsstrahlung photon source
to irradiate the measurement object; NRF interactions in the object preferentially attenuate the photon
flux at specific energies determined by the unique nuclear energy level structure of each isotope according
to how much of the isotope is present in the warhead. The remaining transmitted flux at these energies
goes on to induce further NRF interactions in an encryption foil, leading to NRF emission into high-
purity germanium (HPGe) photon detectors at an observed rate (SI Appendix Eq. S8) that has been
reduced by the presence of the NRF isotope in the warhead. The hashed measurements required for the
template verification protocol are thus the recorded spectra, since it is impossible to precisely determine
the warhead composition (i.e., the thickness D in SI Appendix Eqs. S7 and S8) from the height of the
NRF peaks in the observed spectrum without knowledge of the detailed composition of the foil (i.e., the
thickness X in SI Appendix Eq. S8). The exact foil design is therefore decided by the host and kept secret
from the inspector. The influence of the warhead composition on the height of the NRF peaks—and thus
any sensitive warhead design information—is then said to be physically encrypted by the foil. This tech-
nique uses the laws of physics to mask sensitive information, rather than electronic or computer-based
information barriers, making it substantially more robust against tampering and hoaxing than previously
proposed techniques [7]. Although the detailed construction of the foil is kept secret from the inspector
in order to maintain the encryption, the mere presence of certain characteristic NRF lines in the detected
spectrum corresponds to the presence of certain isotopes in the encryption foil, a fact the inspector may
use to validate the utility of a given foil without breaking the encryption. The foil may also be placed
under joint custody of the host and inspector to ensure it has not been altered between the template
and candidate measurements. As an additional layer of information security, the host may add optional
‘encryption plates’ of warhead materials to the measured object so that even if precise inference about
the measured object is possible, it is impossible to infer anything about the warhead alone.
To protect against geometric hoaxes, the MIT protocol includes measurements of template and candi-
date warheads in random or multiple random orientations due to the difficulty for the host to engineer a
hoax warhead that could mimic the template signal successfully along multiple projections. To increase
the information security of this protocol, each orientation may be paired with a unique cryptographic
foil to dilute the information content of the multiple measurements. Ref. [12] discusses the required
complexity of such geometric hoaxes, which increases rapidly with number of projections measured.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Following the design depicted in Fig. 1, a bremsstrahlung beam was used to illuminate a circular
section of the object undergoing interrogation. Since no real nuclear warheads were available in an
6academic setting, several proxy warheads were constructed. The proxy warheads were objects with a set
of isotopes—U-238 and Al-27—that form the basis for proof-of-concept NRF experiments and subsequent
extrapolations to more realistic settings involving weapon isotopes such as U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-240.
The first proxy genuine target (“template I”) was constructed from DU plates of total thickness 3.18 mm
(wrapped in thin layers of Al foil, amounting to a total thickness of ∼0.25 mm) encased between two
19 mm-thick layers of high-density polyethylene (HDPE) as proxy high explosives. In the first hoax
target (“hoax Ia”), the DU was replaced by 5.29 mm of Pb sheets in order to match the nominal areal
densities of high-Z material to better than 1%. A second measurement of template I was made on the
following day of experiments to emulate the verification of a genuine candidate warhead (“candidate Ig”).
The Pb hoax was similarly re-measured (“hoax Ib”). To emulate measurements on different warhead
designs, a second genuine target (“template II”) with double the thickness of DU was also tested against
a hoax with double the thickness of Pb (“hoax IIc”) and against a partial hoax (“hoax IId”) in which
only half the DU was replaced. In total, seven measurements were conducted on five different targets (see
Table I and Figs. S10–S14).
Experiments were performed at MIT’s High Voltage Research Laboratory (HVRL), which houses a
continuous-wave Van de Graaff electron accelerator capable of producing electron kinetic energies of 2.0–
3.0 MeV at beam currents of up to 30 µA. For the physical cryptography measurements, a 2.52 MeV
electron beam at the maximum stable current (between 25–30 µA) was directed towards a water-cooled
bremsstrahlung radiator consisting of a 126 µm-thick Au foil and approximately 1 cm of Cu backing. The
resulting 2.52 MeV endpoint bremsstrahlung photon beam was then collimated with a 20 cm-long conical
collimator of entry diameter 9.86 mm and exit diameter 26.72 mm, producing an opening half-angle of
about 5◦. The beam configuration and stability are discussed in SI Appendix §S2.
Optional encryption plates directly after the collimator may be included as an additional layer of
information security. The encryption plates are composed of warhead materials in amounts unknown to
the inspector, so that any inference about the warhead composition will in fact be an inference on the
warhead plus encryption plates, thus protecting the warhead information. As with the encryption foil,
the encryption plates must remain constant between the template and candidate measurements. In these
experiments, no such encryption plates were included in order to maximize the available flux and thus
the statistical precision and sensitivity of the measurements.
After passing through the proxy warhead or hoax, the transmitted flux then impinged on the encryp-
tion foil, which was constructed from 3.18 mm of DU plates followed by 63.5 mm of aluminum plates.
The uranium and aluminum components demonstrate the verification measurement for high- and low-Z
materials, respectively. Specifically, the measurements in this work are designed to show the detection of
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the physical cryptographic NRF measurement. As an information security measure, the large
Pb shields prevent the HPGe detectors from directly observing the the proxy warhead. Annotated photographs of
the experiment geometry are shown in SI Appendix Figs. S1 and S2.
high-Z material diversions and the verification of low-Z material consistency.
The combined NRF signature of the measurement target plus encryption foil—at this point physically
encrypted—was measured using three mechanically cooled Ortec 100% relative efficiency GEM P-type
coaxial HPGe photon detectors. The detectors were placed ∼45 cm from the foil at an angle of 55◦ to
the beam axis, and surrounded by lead to shield against NRF photons directly from the warhead, as
well as active backgrounds from the experimental setting which would otherwise limit the performance of
the detectors. The shielding moreover prevents the detectors from observing any passive photon spectra
generated by radioactive material in the test objects. The lead shielding thickness ranged from 51 mm
below the detectors to 254–305 mm along the line of sight from the collimator and warhead to the
detectors. Only a 25.4 mm lead filter was placed between the detectors and encryption foil. This reduced
by multiple orders of magnitude the low energy photon flux, which can cause pileup and dead time in
the detectors, with only a moderate reduction in the NRF signal. Finally, Canberra Lynx Digital Signal
Analyzers were used to record the photon spectra in acquisition periods of five minutes (real time) in
order to save the spectra for offline analysis and to estimate the detector dead time.
A 38.1 mm right square cylinder lanthanum bromide (LaBr3) crystal was placed downstream from
the foil as an independent diagnostic for the bremsstrahlung beam flux. It should be emphasized that
such additional measurements are not part of the verification protocol. They are, however, useful in an
8experimental setting for determining the bremsstrahlung endpoint energy of 2.52 MeV (despite the 2.6 MV
reading of the accelerator terminal voltage—see SI Appendix §S2 2) as small shifts in electron energy can
have a large effect on absolute photon flux (and thus measurement time) near the endpoint. The LaBr3
scintillator was chosen for its extremely fast decay time (16 ns) and encased in a lead hut in order to avoid
high pileup rates that could complicate the endpoint measurement—the detector was directly downbeam
from the radiator, otherwise shielded only by the warhead and encryption foil. The detector was controlled
using the ROOT-based [20] ADAQAcquisition software [21] and a CAEN DT-5790M digitizer.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For each measured object, photon spectra2 from multiple acquisition periods and three separate detec-
tors are combined into a single live-charge-normalized3 spectrum in order to improve the signal-to-noise
ratio (see SI Appendix §S3). Each spectrum is then fit with a series of Gaussian functions for the eight
observed NRF peaks in the signal region near 2.1–2.3 MeV, on top of an exponentially decaying contin-
uum background. U-238 contributes the 2.176, 2.209, and 2.245 MeV peaks, the branched decays 45 keV
below each of these three, and a small peak with no branch at 2.146 MeV. Al-27 contributes the intense
2.212 MeV peak. The Pb isotopes have no NRF lines below 2.3 MeV. Altogether, the spectral fitting
function is written as
f(E) = exp (c1 + c2E) +
8∑
k=1
ak√
2piσk
exp
[
−(E − Ek)
2
2σ2k
]
(2)
where c1 and c2 describe the shape of the continuum, and ak, Ek, and σk are the area, mean, and standard
deviation fit parameters of the kth peak. With eight sets of three peak parameters and two parameters
for the continuum, this results in a total of 26 parameters per spectrum.
Once the 26-parameter fit (and set of associated fit parameter uncertainties) for each spectrum is
computed using Eq. 2, the detected NRF rate in each peak in counts per live µA·s, as predicted by
integration of SI Appendix Eq. S8, can be extracted as simply Ak = ak/∆E, where ak is the value of
the area fit parameter for the kth peak, and the division by the spectrum bin width ∆E enforces proper
dimensions and normalization [22, p. 171]. Similarly, the uncertainty in the NRF rate is δAk = δak/∆E
(where δx is used to express the 1 standard deviation uncertainty in a value x so as to distinguish it from
other uses of the symbol σ) where δak is the uncertainty in the ak fit parameter as reported by ROOT’s
TH1::Fit() subroutines [20].
2 Data and analysis code are available at https://github.com/jvavrek/PNAS2018
3 The term ‘live’ is used to denote measurement times calculated using live time, i.e., the real time minus the detector’s
dead time. ‘Live charge’ therefore corresponds to the product of beam current with live time.
9One possible test statistic T for comparing the NRF peaks of a single isotope is the sum of net rates
Ak (above the fit background) of the six U-238 peaks well-separated from the doublet: 2.131, 2.146, 2.164,
2.176, 2.200, and 2.245 MeV. The 2.209 MeV component of the 2.209 and 2.212 MeV doublet tends to
have a larger uncertainty such that it does not contribute reliably to T , and thus is excluded. Moreover,
since the amount of Al-27 (and the total high-Z areal density) does not change between the warhead
and hoax objects, the 2.212 MeV peak rate is consistent throughout the measurements (up to day-to-day
beam variations—see SI Appendix §S2 2). To compare the NRF spectrum of a candidate object to that
of the genuine template, the discrepancy ν is defined as the difference in T divided by the uncertainty in
the difference:
ν ≡ Tcand − Ttemp√
(δTcand)2 + (δTtemp)2
. (3)
As the presence of an NRF isotope in the object reduces the corresponding observed NRF rate (and
thus T ), ν > 0 indicates a possible diversion of the isotope in the candidate compared to the template,
while ν < 0 indicates a possible addition. Under the null hypothesis that the candidate object is a real
nuclear warhead, Tcand = Ttemp, so that (due to statistics alone) ν is normally distributed with mean 0
and standard deviation 1: ν ∼ N (0, 1). As such, ν measures the discrepancy from the null hypothesis
in number of standard deviations (“sigmas”) where, e.g., the probability of observing a 5σ discrepancy
(regardless of sign) by chance alone, i.e., |ν| > 5, is 6 × 10−7. Setting an alarm threshold |ν| > ν∗ by
necessity trades-off the probability that the measurement declares a genuine warhead to be a hoax (type I
error) and the probability that it declares a hoax warhead to be genuine (type II error). If low type I
error is prioritized, a suitable alarm threshold may be ν∗ = 5, while ν∗ = 3 may be more suitable if low
type II error is desired.
Figs. 2, 3, and 4 show the culmination of the above analysis procedure for the fourth verification
scenario listed in Table I (template II vs hoax IIc). Fig. 2 contains the two combined spectra measured
for the template II (DU) and hoax IIc (Pb) proxy warheads; in this unzoomed energy range, the genuine
and hoax spectra at first appear to match quite closely, with no obvious distinguishing features. Focusing
on the NRF signal region in Fig. 3 (where only the template II spectrum is shown for clarity), the NRF
peaks from U-238 and Al-27 become visible; Fig. 4 subsequently shows the 26-parameter fits to the two
spectra and the computed discrepancy of ν = 10.7. The discrepancies for all verification scenarios are
shown in Table I (see also SI Appendix Table S1). In all four hoax scenarios, a discrepancy in T greater
than an alarm threshold of ν∗ = 3 was attained in ∼20 µA·h (live, on three detectors) per measured
object, indicating diversions in the uranium component. In the genuine candidate scenario, the 1.7σ
discrepancy in uranium (primarily a result of day-to-day beam variations) does not trigger the alarm at
ν∗ = 3, and is clearly delineated from the much larger observed discrepancies in the hoax cases. Similarly,
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FIG. 2. Measured spectra for DU template II (black points) and Pb hoax IIc (red points). In this and subsequent
Figures, error bars are ±1 SD.
the Al-27 comparisons all exhibit |ν| < 2, indicating consistency in the aluminum component across all
measurement scenarios.
The continua underlying the peaks—generated from both pileup and secondary electron bremsstrahlung
in the foil—also provide some insight. For the spectra in Fig. 2, the integrals from 1–2 MeV differ by 5%.
The differences rise to 6–10% when comparing measurements performed on different days due to beam
variations, but are only 2% in the other same-day measurements. Though these small differences are
significant given the high statistics at low energies, the close matching of continua between the template
and hoax scenarios suggests that the continuum background may not encode any appreciable information
about the isotopic content of the weapon. This lack of distinguishing information in the majority of the
spectrum also may indicate that non-resonant photon transmission measurements such as radiographs
would likely fail to detect hoaxes of the same areal density.
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TABLE I. Proxy warhead verification measurements
# scenario Al-27 discrep. U-238 discrep.
- - ν (vs template) ν (vs template)
0 template I - -
1 hoax Ia (100% Pb) −0.051 σ 7.9 σ
2 genuine candidate Ig 0.76 σ 1.7 σ
3 hoax Ib (100% Pb) 1.7 σ 9.8 σ
4 template II - -
5 hoax IIc (100% Pb) 0.25 σ 10.7 σ
6 hoax IId (50% Pb) 1.9 σ 4.6 σ
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in Table I.
DISCUSSION
Extrapolation to future systems
The proxy warheads used in this article are relatively thin—templates I and II have total on-axis areal
densities of ∼11 and 17 g/cm2, respectively—and do not accurately represent typical areal densities of
real warheads. More realistic warhead models in the open literature range from the compact (∼50 g/cm2)
Black Sea-type warhead used in [12] to the thicker (∼200 g/cm2) models of Fetter et al. [23]. Moreover,
verification measurements conducted on real warheads will use the NRF lines associated with the fuel
isotopes U-235 or Pu-239, whose strongest lines are 2–5× less intense than the U-238 lines considered
in this work [24]. In the present experimental design, verification of realistic weapon designs would
therefore require several orders of magnitude longer measurement times than the ∼60 detector live µA·h
used here (see Table II). In a dedicated warhead verification facility, however, these unrealistically long
measurement times could be ameliorated by increasing the electron beam current and the number of
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detectors (see SI Appendix §S4). A modern commercially available electron accelerator may have a
continuous wave beam current of at least 5 mA at ∼3 MeV [25], a factor of 200× improvement over
the 25 µA used in this experiment. While this increase in beam current would affect the event rate in
the detectors (thus reducing the effective live time), the increase in the event rate is only ∼30× due to
the increased attenuation of realistic warheads (see SI Appendix §S4). This increase may be mitigated
by reducing the detector sizes and the operating with more detectors, by optimizing the balance of the
detector event rate and the available measurement time, or by taking advantage of future developments of
high-rate HPGe detectors capable of operating at MHz rates [26]. Additionally, the shielding and detector
filters used in this experiment could be signficantly optimize to reduce the low energy photon rate in the
HPGe detectors to further alleviate this effect. Extending the array of detectors from three to 30 would
provide another factor of 10× reduction in measurement time, and would provide the additional benefit
of reducing the dose to the warhead—here estimated at ∼30 Gy per 1 hour measurement at 25 µA for
template I—required to achieve the same confidence. Doses for other warhead configurations are presented
in Ref. [12]. Such a dedicated verification system would be capable of attaining 5σ confidence in a single
NRF line in a Pb hoax scenario involving the Fetter et al. uranium-uranium model of Table II in ∼15–
20 minutes per projection per object, for a capital cost on the order of USD 5M. This required runtime
increases to ∼5 hours for the worst-case plutonium-uranium model in Table II. For thinner warheads, or
for warheads that have been partially disassembled, even lower measurement times would be required,
creating opportunities for measurements at multiple warhead orientations, for measurements of isotopes
with weaker NRF lines, or for ruling out less discernible hoaxes. More information on the calculation of
the required runtimes for realistic warhead configurations may be found in SI Appendix Section S4.
TABLE II. Warhead geometries and approximate detector live charges required for Pb replacement hoax detection
at 5σ.
comparison (model ref.) NRF line foil det. live µA hr
WGU+W vs Pb+W [23] U-235 1.733 MeV WGU 25× 103
WGU+DU vs Pb+DU [23] U-235 1.733 MeV WGU 40× 103
WGPu+W vs Pb+W [23] Pu-239 2.431 MeV WGPu 600× 103
WGPu+DU vs Pb+DU [23] Pu-239 2.431 MeV WGPu 800× 103
WGU vs Pb [12] U-235 1.733 MeV WGU 0.15× 103
WGPu vs Pb [12] Pu-239 2.431 MeV WGPu 3.5× 103
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Information security
The equation for the predicted NRF rates (SI Appendix Eq. S8 or its integrated form), contains
multiple quantities that are kept secret from the inspector, and thus cannot be used alone to infer the
warhead thickness D from a physically encrypted spectrum. However, it may be possible to construct
a system of equations from SI Appendix Eq. S8—one equation per NRF peak—and make a series of
simplifying approximations, in which case there may be at least as many equations as unknowns and
inference may be possible. As previously shown in Fig. 1 and described in [12, SI §7.1], a solution to this
multi-line inference problem is to include optional encryption plates of relevant materials of unknown
thickness ∆D to the collimator output. As such, any inference on the isotope of interest will estimate
only an upper bound D+ ∆D. In fact, if such encryption plates are used, the foil parameter X no longer
needs to be kept secret from the inspector, eliminating the information security complexities of ensuring
that the foil has not been nefariously designed.
Lastly, the continuum background may contain sensitive information, especially given the large number
of photons it comprises over the entire range of the spectrum (see Fig. 2). The ‘logarithmic slope’
parameter c2 in Eq. 2, for instance, depends moderately on the atomic number Z of the foil materials [27].
As discussed above, however, the continuum appears to encode very little information about the Z of the
warhead materials for a fixed areal density. A thorough analysis of the continuum information content
is therefore a vital next step in the analysis of the physical cryptographic NRF protocol. For a more
complete discussion of information security issues and possible solutions, the reader is referred to [12].
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have reported on the successful demonstration of the MIT tNRF physical cryptographic warhead
verification protocol. The isotope-sensitive tNRF measurement is capable of distinguishing proxy nuclear
warheads from hoax objects with high confidence in total measurement times of around one hour per
object. Extrapolations to more realistic warhead designs indicate that a dedicated warhead verification
facility could conduct 5σ verification measurements in less than an hour while protecting sensitive warhead
design information.
The NRF verification technique may be expanded to other isotopes that may be found in nuclear
weapons (beyond U-238 and Al-27) such as U-235 or Pu-239 in the fissile fuel and nitrogen and carbon
isotopes in the high explosives [28]. Similarly, testing the measurement’s sensitivity to geometric hoaxes
would be a useful development. Finally, an additional layer of information security may be added through
analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) with non-uniform binning, which are currently being developed. Such
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ADCs would act as very low-level, more easily-verifiable information barriers. If installed in the acquisition
systems of the HPGe detectors, such ADCs could be used to remove all spectral features except one NRF
line per isotope from the observed spectrum, thus eliminating possible information security concerns such
as the continuum and the multi-line inference problem.
In a broader context, the implementation of any warhead verification protocol in a real arms control
agreement faces two challenges. First, an assessment of the protocol’s utility and security must be made by
nuclear weapons laboratories. To this end, future work on any warhead verification protocol should involve
collaboration with the US and possibly Russian national laboratories, and possibly combining multiple
proposed verification techniques as part of an overarching protocol. Such a joint effort will enable research
that otherwise could not be conducted in academic settings, such as the aforementioned measurements
involving weapons isotopes and realistic, classified weapon geometries. Finally, the implementation of a
warhead verification protocol is predicated on the existence of future arms control frameworks, and thus
requires a commitment to the goal of deep reductions in the world’s nuclear arsenals.
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Appendix S1: Nuclear resonance fluorescence
Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) describes the X(γ, γ′)X reaction in which a photon γ is reso-
nantly absorbed by the nucleus X and then re-emitted as the excited nucleus subsequently relaxes to its
ground state [18, 19]. Due to the discrete energy level structure of the nucleus, the probability that an
incident photon of energy E undergoes an NRF interaction is only significant if E is approximately equal
to one of the resonance energies Er of the nucleus, given by
Er = E` +
E2
Mc2
(S1)
where E` is the energy of a nuclear level and the latter term corrects for the recoil energy (∼20 eV for
U-238 and E = 2 MeV) of the nucleus X with mass M . The probability of absorption by state r is then
given by the NRF cross section, which is most accurately described by a Doppler-broadened version of
the Lorentzian profile of Eq. 1:
σNRFr (E) = 2pi
1/2gr
(
~c
Er
)2 br,0
t1/2
∫ +∞
−∞
exp
[
−(x− y)
2
4t
]
dy
1 + y2
, (S2)
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where
x ≡ 2(E − Er)/Γr (S3)
t ≡ (∆/Γr)2, (S4)
Γr is the intrinsic width of the excited state r, and
∆ = E
√
2kBT
Mc2
(S5)
is the Doppler-broadened width of the state at temperature T . For NRF lines of high-Z isotopes, Γr∼1–
100 meV [29] while ∆∼1 eV. For greater accuracy, the ∆ and thus t may be evaluated using the effective
temperature Teff instead of the physical temperature T of the target [18]. The gr is a statistical factor
that accounts for the number of available spin states at the ground and resonant states:
gr =
2Jr + 1
2(2J0 + 1)
(S6)
where Ji for i = {0, r} is the spin of the ith level. The branching ratio br,0 from the resonant state r to
ground also enters the calculation as br,0 ≡ Γr,0/Γr, where Γr,0 is the partial width for the decay r → 0
and
∑
i Γr,i = Γr. The br,i therefore also give the probabilities of the resonant state r decaying either
directly to the ground state, emitting a photon of energy E′ = Er (neglecting recoil), or through the
intermediate state i, emitting a photon of energy E′ = Er − Ei.
Given Eq. S2, the NRF measurement described in the main paper can be described by a slightly
simplified 1D model (see e.g. Fig. 1) in which a parallel incident bremsstrahlung beam φ0(E) is incident
on a single-isotope rectangular slab warhead of thickness D. The transmitted flux φt(E) then interacts
with a rectangular slab foil of thickness X composed of the warhead isotope. In this case, the transmitted
flux φt(E) through the warhead can be written as
φt(E) = φ0(E) exp [−D (µnr(E) + µNRF(E))] , (S7)
where the µ ≡ Nσ terms denote linear attenuation coefficients if D is expressed as a length, or mass
attenuation coefficients if it is expressed as an areal density. This equation assumes that every NRF
or non-resonant (‘nr’) interaction (e.g. Compton scattering, pair production, etc.) results in the loss of
forward-going flux at energy E. Because of the sharp E-dependence of µNRF(E), the forward-going flux is
preferentially attenuated or ‘notched’ at the resonance energies Er of the isotopes present in the warhead.
The above assumption regarding photon losses can break down via a process known as ‘notch refill,’ by
which photons undergo small-angle Compton scattering to the resonance energies, thus replenishing the
available flux in the notches and reducing the sensitivity of the measurement to the warhead [30]. Since
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the notches are narrow, notch refill is only significant for relatively thick measurement targets (e.g. a
correction factor of 5% for areal densities ∼90 g/cm2 [31]) with many opportunities for downscatter.
For a single transition from r → 0 (dropping subscripts for brevity), the double-differential NRF count
rate induced by the transmitted flux φt(E) as observed by a single HPGe detector is
d2n
dEdΩ
= φt(E) b µNRF(E)
W (θ)
4pi
1− exp [−Xµeff(E,E′, θ)]
µeff(E,E′, θ)
int(E
′)Pf (E′) (S8)
where W (θ) is the angular correlation function for successive gamma rays [32] and int(E
′) is the intrinsic
peak efficiency of the HPGe detector. A high-Z (typically Pb) filter may be placed between the foil and
detector in order to preferentially attenuate low-energy photons and reduce detector dead time, in which
case Pf (E
′) < 1 is the probability that an NRF photon of energy E′ will be transmitted through the
filter. The effective attenuation coefficient
µeff(E,E
′, θ) ≡ µNRF(E) + µnr(E) + µnr(E
′)
cos θ
(S9)
accounts for attenuation in the foil of incoming photons (of energy E) via NRF and non-resonant processes
as well as the attenuation of outgoing NRF photons (of energy E′) through the path at angle θ pointing
to the detector. Integration of Eq. S8 over all energies E and the solid angle of the detector Ω then gives
the predicted count rate for a single NRF peak as observed by the detector. The peak will appear not as
a perfectly sharp emission line at E′, but as a Gaussian centered at E′ due to the imperfect resolution of
the detector.
We note that the sharp E-dependence of µNRF(E) in the exponential terms of Eqs. S7 and S8 can sub-
stantially affect the predicted detected count rate [33, Fig. 3.25]: while the Doppler-broadened Lorentzian
profile of Eq. S2 is the most accurate, a Gaussian approximation [18] to the cross section is often sufficient.
The rectangular cross section approximation—a constant value of cross section over an energy range on
the order of 1 eV such that the integral of Eq. S2 over E (the ‘integrated cross section’) is preserved—is
only accurate to about 20% and should be avoided unless computational efficiency is required at the
expense of accuracy.
Appendix S2: Experimental Methods
1. Data acquisition
Data acquisition (DAQ) was accomplished using a Canberra Lynx Digital Signal Analyzer (DSA)
connected to each HPGe detector [34]. Instead of using the standard Genie2K acquisition software,
the three detectors and DAQs were controlled simultaneously using the custom-written Python Readout
with Lynx for Physical Cryptography (PROLyPhyC) wrapper classes sitting atop the Lynx Software
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Development Kit (SDK). Events were recorded in pulse-height analysis (PHA) mode, resulting in a 32768-
channel pulse height spectrum produced for each detector at the end of each acquisition time. To guard
against data corruption due to beam instability, acquisition times were set to five minutes (real time); each
measurement therefore consisted of ∼10 such acquisition periods summed together using the procedure
described in Section S3. The raw pulse height spectra were converted to energy (deposition) spectra using
linear calibrations of channel number vs energy using Cs-137 (0.662 MeV) and Co-60 (1.172, 1.333 MeV)
check sources taken before and throughout the week of experiments.
The integrated beam charge over the course of an acquisition period was determined by using a Keithley
Model 614 Electrometer to measure the beam-induced current from the radiator to ground. The analog
output of the electrometer was digitized by a Measurement Computing Model USB-201 analogue-to-digital
converter at a sample rate of 1 kHz, and read to a plain text file on a laptop for persistent storage. The
average current over the acquisition time was then computed for use in Eq. S1 and compared against the
display of the electrometer throughout the run for consistency.
FIG. S1. Annotated photograph of the target geometry.
2. Beam characterization and stability
The stability and reproducibility of the electron beam settings (most notably, the beam energy, cur-
rent, and position relative to the gold radiator foil) directly affects the validity of comparisons between
template/candidate scenarios, especially when the integrated beam charge is used to normalize measure-
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FIG. S2. Close-up of template I near the collimator exit. The cylinder affixed to the end of the collimator is a gas
ionization chamber used for beam tuning and monitoring.
ments. In particular, preliminary experiments that tested elements of the physical cryptographic protocol
prior to the work reported here indicated that the absolute rate of NRF photon detection was lower than
expected from simulation and analytic calculations by a factor of 1.5–2 [35]. A number of possible ex-
planations for this observation were explored, and uncertainties in the electron beam position, emittance,
and energy were identified as the most likely causes of the discrepancy. While knowledge of the absolute
bremsstrahlung flux is not required to perform the relative spectral comparisons between template and
candidate warheads, any temporal variance in the flux could make such comparisons invalid. Due to this,
several operational procedures and diagnostics were implemented to complement and enhance the existing
HVRL beam diagnostics. The results of these diagnostics are presented in this section, demonstrating
that while variations in the beam may have affected previous experiments, the beam conditions were
well-understood and constrained for the data presented in this work due to the improvements.
a. Electron beam energy
The electron beam kinetic energy was chosen as 2.6 MeV as a compromise of several competing
factors. An ideal beam for this application maximizes the number of photons at the specific energies of
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the NRF lines of interest while minimizing photons at other energies. Photons above the NRF energies
may undergo various physical processes that may cause them to scatter into the detectors resulting in
background counts in the region of the spectrum near the NRF energies and additionally contribute to
the notch refill effect discussed in Section S1. Below the NRF energies, photons contribute to pile-up
effects in detectors and add to the radiation dose to which inspected objects are exposed. To balance
these effects when studying NRF lines, it is most effective to choose an endpoint energy a few hundred
keV above the NRF energies. For a photon source produced by the bremsstrahlung of electrons, the
number of photons rapidly decreases as a function of energy with no photons produced above the energy
of the incident electrons, as visible in the spectra shown in Fig. S3. Due to this sharp drop-off in the
spectrum, however, the total flux of photons at the NRF energies depends strongly on the precise location
of the endpoint. This is illustrated in Fig. S4, which shows the ratio of the forward bremsstrahlung fluxes
of electron beams of nominal (2.6 MeV) energy and of energy below nominal (2.521 MeV). This ∼3%
change in the beam energy results in &10% change at the NRF lines energies, which is further magnified
by the even greater reduction at higher energies (since these photons can downscatter within the mock
warhead and/or foil to add to the flux). While the absolute flux of the bremsstrahlung beam is not
required for the comparative measurements presented here, this effect necessitates establishing that the
beam energy was consistent between measurements. The HVRL electron beam energy was set using a
generating voltmeter (GVM), which measured the potential across the accelerator terminals [36]. When
used for this purpose, however, GVMs require regular, independent calibration to the actual electron
beam energy, a process that had not been conducted for the HVRL beam for some time prior to the
experiments described in this work. Additionally, since the GVM reading was not recorded throughout
the run (so as to monitor its fluctuations), it is critical to establish the stability of the beam energy
between the different measurements.
To measure the electron beam energy, the LaBr3 scintillator spectra of the bremsstrahlung photons
for each data run were examined. The LaBr3 detector [37] is especially well-suited for examining spectral
features in the vicinity of 2.0–2.7 MeV due to the presence of intrinsic spectral lines in this region that
are due to alpha decays from the decay chain of Ac-227, which is a contaminant in LaBr3 due to the
chemical similarities of La and Ac [38]. The electronic-equivalent energy depositions from several of these
decays allow a precise calibration of the ADC-photon energy calibration of the detector in this region.
Following the experimental run, a long sample of the intrinsic spectrum of the detector was collected to
provide a precise energy calibration. To account for a possible shift in the gain of the detector over the
course of the experimental run, the ADC channel position corresponding to the 511 keV peak (caused
by the plentiful e+/e− pair production interactions caused by photons with energy greater than 1022
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FIG. S3. Calibrated spectrum of the bremsstrahlung beam recorded by the LaBr3 detector after transmission
through the encryption foil and the 6-inch Pb filter shielding the scintillator at a nominal beam energy of 2.6 MeV.
In this and all subsequent Figures, error bars are ±1 SD.
keV in the bremsstrahlung beam) was determined for each of the data runs as a measure of the shift
in gain and is shown in Fig. S5. The shift in this peak position relative to the data taken immediately
before the intrinsic calibration run was used to correct the gain drift for each spectrum to calibrate the
individual spectra. Additionally, pulse shape discrimination was utilized to exclude pile-up events (in
which two photons contributed to a single count in the spectrum). Since such events contribute relatively
significantly to the high-energy end of the spectrum, rejecting them is necessary to sharply reconstruct
features such as the spectral endpoint.
For each calibrated spectrum, the point at which the second derivative of the spectrum was max-
imal (determined numerically) was found, indicating the position at which the rapidly decreasing
bremsstrahlung spectrum met the relatively flatter background above the endpoint, thus indicating
the energy of the incident electron beam. Fig. S7 shows the shape of the spectrum endpoint for each
data run, illustrating the fact that the rapid drop-off in the bremsstrahlung spectrum occurred at a lower
energy than the nominal 2.6 MeV endpoint. Fig. S6 shows the results of the fit determination for each
of the data runs. This procedure contributes 4 keV systematic uncertainty to the overall determination
of the endpoint, while the gain drift conservatively contributes another ∼0.5% uncertainty (reduced from
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FIG. S4. Ratio of the simulated 2.521 MeV endpoint bremsstrahlung spectra to the simulated 2.6 MeV endpoint
spectra, showing the order 10% deficit of photons in the former case relative to the latter in the region of interest
around 2 MeV.
the total drift by the correction described). Averaging the results of the individual electron beam energy
extractions results in a beam energy determination of (2.521 ± 0.015) MeV, lower than the nominally
determined beam energy. As shown in Fig. S6, however, the endpoint energy was very stable to within
the quoted uncertainty over the entire experimental run, demonstrating that variations in the beam
energy did not systematically affect any comparisons between template and candidate proxy warheads.
Understanding this systemic offset, however, is critical for any future analyses that require knowledge of
the absolute photon flux.
b. Electron beam position
The spectrum of bremsstrahlung photons emitted from a radiator depends significantly on the geometry
and materials of the radiator, and thus may also depend on the position at which the electrons are incident
on the radiator. In particular, the number of photons generated near the endpoint energy is maximized
by ensuring that the photons first strike the highest atomic number material (in this case the gold of
the 126 µm foil) prior to losing energy through interactions with other materials. If the position of the
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FIG. S5. Position of the 511 keV pair production peak in the LaBr3 over the course of the entire experimental run
for the data presented in this paper. With the exception of Run #81, the gain of the LaBr3 detector was stable to
within 1.5%. Dashed lines indicate gaps between days of operation.
electron beam deviates from the center of the foil or if the electron beam has a significant width beyond
the 0.5 cm radius of the gold foil, the bremsstrahlung photon spectrum is altered and any inconsistencies
in these parameters over the course of the experimental run could induce differences between the different
proxy warhead tests.
To study possible magnitude of this effect, the effect of beam wander on the bremsstrahlung spectrum
was simulated using the Geant4 toolkit [39]. In this simulation, the geometry of the bremsstrahlung
radiator and collimator were modeled in detail based on experimental survey of the objects, shown in
Fig. S8, and electron beams of energy 2.6 MeV were simulated incident upon the radiator at different
positions. The simulated beams were infinitely narrow and incident normal to the face of the radiator.
The incident position of the beam was varied radially from the center of the gold foil (r = 0 mm) to
beyond the foil radius so that the electrons were directly incident on the copper frame (r = 14 mm). For
each beam position, the number of bremsstrahlung photons incident on the mock warhead target (i.e.,
beyond the collimator) was counted and compared to the number generated when the beam was centered
at the same electron current. The results of this study are shown in Fig. S9, plotted as the ratio of the
number photons generated above 1.9 MeV (i.e., in the NRF region of interest) for a given beam position
to the number generated with the beam on center. The simulation shows that while the beam remains
on the gold foil (r < 5 mm) the number of high energy photons remains within a few percent of the ideal
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FIG. S6. Extracted electron beam energy for each of the production data runs. While below the nominal value of
2.6 MeV, the endpoint was consistent to within uncertainties for the entire data-taking period.
value. For r > 5 mm, the high energy photon count drops precipitously. Thus, as long as the beam
remains on the foil throughout the experiments, the beam position uncertainty contributes a systematic
uncertainty of at most .1% to the comparisons of different mock warheads. Large deviations in beam
position, however, would have a significant effect on the data by greatly reducing the number of photons
available for the NRF interactions.
During the experiments described in this work, there existed no means of concurrently monitoring the
beam position and width. Prior to these experiments however, the HVRL electron beam was imaged
using a beryllium oxide screen as part of the experiments conducted by another user of the facility. Using
this imaging system, the electron beam focusing elements were tuned to minimize the beam diameter and
maximize its positional stability for the 2.6 MeV beam energy setting required for the experiments used
in this paper. The BeO screen was placed 200 cm from the dipole magnet (located at the “bend” of the
e− beam shown Fig. S1). At this distance, the electron beam diameter could be held to smaller than
the 5 cm×5 cm screen and stable in position to within a few millimeters (see the video included in the
supplemental materials, courtesy of C.S. Epstein). Given that the radiator foil was located approximately
20 cm from the dipole bend, and that the beam is maximally focused when exiting the dipole, it is
likely that the beam was well confined to the gold foil throughout the experimental run and thus the
contribution to the uncertainty on the NRF lines measurements from beam wander is limited to ∼1%.
Since this uncertainty is negligible compared to the statistical uncertainty of the data, it is neglected in
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FIG. S7. Overlain calibrated and pile-up rejected spectra from the LaBr3 detector for all data runs, showing the
difference between the extracted endpoint at 2521 keV (black dashed line) and the nominal endpoint at 2600 keV
(red dashed line).
the analysis.
c. Beam conditioning
Due to the age and the electrostatic mechanism of the HVRL electron accelerator, the accelerator
had to be regularly ‘conditioned’ by running an incoherent electron plasma (as opposed to a coherent
beam) through the beamline to burn off contaminants. Failure to regularly condition the beam would
lead to deviations in the beam current and energy, invalidating any data collected until the beam was
reconditioned. Care was taken to regularly condition the beam and monitor its stability, and any data
taken during periods in which a significant beam parameter deviated from the nominal value was excluded
from the main analyses. Deviations were observed as uncontrolled shifts in the measured electron beam
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FIG. S8. Visualization of the solid model of the bremsstrahlung radiator used for simulated beam studies. The
exposed gold foil in the center had a diameter of 1 cm.
current, shifts in the measured terminal voltage, or unexplained changes or time-variance in the spectra
from the HPGe and LaBr3 detectors (which were monitored online). During the experimental run in
which the data presented here was collected, typically 30 minutes of conditioning were required for every
four hours of run time. This frequency would have been higher were it not for the beam effectively being
conditioned by another group’s experiment during the previous week (during which the beam imaging
and tuning described in the previous section was conducted). It should be noted that a modern, dedicated
accelerator facility for the purpose of an implemented weapons verification program would not face such
limitations.
d. Summary of beam effects
The combination of this flux reduction due to the beam energy, past lack of constraint on wandering of
the beam condition, and less stable beam conditions in prior experiments is hypothesized to account for the
factor of 1.5–2 ratio of predicted over observed absolute NRF rates in preliminary experiments [35]. The
beam diagnostics used for the experimental campaign presented here indicate that these issues were, in
general, rectified for the data presented. In particular, these analyses indicate that the beam conditions
were very stable. Thus, while there may be remaining uncertainties on the absolute bremsstrahlung
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FIG. S9. Simulated effect of drift in the beam position on the flux of photons with E > 1.9 MeV incident on the
mock warhead.
flux, this flux was consistent and thus relative comparisons between different mock warheads are not
subject to significant uncertainties from the beam conditions. Such cancellation of consistent, systematic
uncertainties is an inherent advantage of any template verification system.
Appendix S3: Analysis of data from multiple detectors
1. Data unification
For each measured object, data from multiple acquisition periods and three separate detectors is
combined into a single spectrum in order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. First, the count rate rdi
(counts per live second per µA) in the ith bin of detector d’s spectrum is the live-charge-normalized sum
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of bin contents (i.e. raw counts) cdij in each of the j runs:
rdi =
∑
j c
d
ij∑
j t
d
`,jIb,j
(S1)
where Ib,j is the average beam current recorded in run j, and the live time t
d
`,j is computed from the real
time tdr,j = 300 s and the detector dead time fraction f
d
dt,j (as reported by each detector’s Lynx DSA) as
td`,j = t
d
r,j(1− fddt,j). (S2)
To build a meaningful sum across the three detectors d, each histogram of rates rd must have an equal
number of bins and locations of bin centers. This is difficult to achieve in practice, however, since each
detector has a different calibration (depending on its gain and unique response function) for converting
from a bin number in the range 1-32768 to energy deposition in MeV. As a result, the calibrated bin
widths and bin centers, in general, differ among the detectors. This is solved in post-processing by a
combination of recalibration and histogram interpolation. As a common starting point, each histogram
rd is linearly recalibrated using its peaks at 0.511 MeV (pair production), 1.001 MeV (U-238 passive
signature), and 2.212 MeV (Al-27 NRF emission), all of which are prominent in the beam-on spectrum.
A new histogram r¯d with 3000 1 keV-wide bins between 0 and 3 MeV is then generated by interpolation
of rd, and scaled by the ratio of new to old bin widths in order to keep constant the differential counts
per unit energy. The bin errors δr¯di are finally recomputed under Poisson statistics as
δr¯di =
√
r¯di∑
j t
d
`,jIb,j
(S3)
which just amounts to reverting the live-charge-scaled spectra to count spectra, computing the bin error
as the square root of the (interpolated) counts, and then re-dividing by the live charge. The detector-
summed spectrum is then just the bin-by-bin sum r¯i =
∑
d r¯
d
i . Note: the peak resolutions of ∼0.05%
(σ) at ∼2.2 MeV in the spectrum r¯ (after processing) were verified to be consistent with those in the
individual spectra rd (before processing).
2. Fitting procedure
The interpolated histograms r¯ (see Figs. S10–S14) are fit with an exponential background plus a series
of Gaussian peaks as given in Eq. 2 of the main article. Such high-dimensional fits are achieved reliably
by an iterative process: each peak is first fit individually with a five-parameter Gaussian plus linear
background curve, where the initial parameter estimates and bounds for ROOT’s χ2 minimization are
computed using rough linear approximations. In the case of the closely-spaced 2.209 MeV and 2.212 MeV
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lines from U-238 and Al-27, respectively, an eight-parameter doublet fit is used instead. A first-order
estimate of the continuum is then made by fitting the entire spectrum (including the peaks) with a single
exponential curve. The two parameters of this exponential, along with the area, mean, and standard
deviation estimates of each of the six peaks, are then input directly as starting estimates for the full 26-
parameter fit. Parameter bounds are established in a similar fashion by allowing some tolerance around
the starting estimates.
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FIG. S10. Summed spectra (points) and fits (curves) in the template I (black) vs hoax Ia (red) verification mea-
surement.
Appendix S4: Extrapolation calculations for realistic warhead measurements
The extrapolations to more realistic warhead models and future dedicated verification systems are
computed using Eq. S8, which predicts the detected count rate of a single NRF line for a given encryption
foil and warhead geometry. All calculations assume isotropic NRF emission for simplicity (especially
when spin states are unknown in e.g. U-235), and use the same Pb filter transmission probability function
Pf (E) ∼ 0.25, intrinsic peak detector efficiency int ' 0.16, and single-detector geometric efficiency
Ωd/4pi ' 1.3 × 10−3 used in this work’s experiments. The incident bremsstrahlung spectrum φ0(E) is
computed in a Geant4 simulation of the 126 µm Au radiator with an electron beam energy of 2.521 MeV
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FIG. S11. Summed spectra (points) and fits (curves) in the template I (black) vs genuine candidate Ig (red)
verification measurement.
as determined in Fig. S6, and it is assumed that the simulated flux accurately predicts the flux that would
be observed in the laboratory. For use in Eq. S8, φ0(E) is approximated as a pencil beam impinging on
the axis of a concentric-shell warhead. Calculations for different warhead models assume different foil
compositions (though maintain the X = 3.18 mm thickness) and therefore consider different NRF lines
depending on whether a uranium or plutonium component would need to be verified. In both cases, the
NRF line used in Eq. S8 is chosen as the ground-state transition with the highest integrated cross section
based on the values in Table I of [24], excluding those (in particular, the Pu-239 2143.56 keV transition)
with poorly-understood nuclear level schemes. In all scenarios, a Pb hoax is constructed by replacing a
weapon-isotope component with the same areal density of Pb. The runtime (quantified in ‘detector live
microamp hours’, i.e. the triple product of the number of detectors, the beam current, and the live time)
required to distinguish the NRF count rates r1 and r2 of the genuine and hoax warheads at a confidence
ν ′ of 5σ is computed as
ν ′ =
r2 − r1√
r1/C` + r2/C`
. (S1)
where the triple product C` is assumed to be equal in the two measurements. Table II in the article
lists the results of these calculations for six different warhead geometries. The extrapolation calculations
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FIG. S12. Summed spectra (points) and fits (curves) in the template I (black) vs hoax Ib (red) verification
measurement.
given in the article, for instance, use 30 detectors and a 5 mA current to arrive at a measurement time of
roughly 20 minutes (per object) for the second entry of Table II. These calculations use only the counts
in a single NRF line, but summing the lines from a single isotope will increase the statistics and reduce
the quoted required measurement times.
We note that for more realistic (i.e. non-slab) geometries, the precise alignment of the beam, warhead,
foil, and detectors may become important for the prediction of absolute NRF count rates in a verification
measurement. These systematic factors will cancel in the verification measurement, however, if they are
kept constant between template and candidate measurements. For completeness, we estimate here the
effect of a misalignment of the warhead transverse to the beam, which effectively changes the warhead
thickness X. If we take for simplicity a nominal spherical shell of DU with inner and outer radii of 6.3
and 6.5 cm, respectively, and measure until 2000 counts are obtained in the 2.176 MeV line of U-238,
we find (using Eq. S8) that a 1σ discrepancy in the observed 2.176 MeV rate requires a misalignment
of approximately 1.6 cm. Such displacements may also affect the solid angle integration of Eq. S8,
changing the geometric efficiency by factors on the order of 10%, depending on the foil-to-detector distance.
However, geometric control on scales < 1 cm is feasible with appropriate survey equipment. This effect
is further mitigated by the fact that the bremsstrahlung beam has a spatial width and thus samples an
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FIG. S13. Summed spectra (points) and fits (curves) in the template II (black) vs hoax IIc (red) verification
measurement.
extended area of warhead at a given time. For these experiments, the opening half-angle of the cone of
beam was approximately 5◦ and the photon illumination in this cone was relatively uniform (to better than
10%). The collimation of the beam could be adjusted to further cancel misalignment effects by adjusting
the size and uniformity of the beam spot on the inspected object. Finally, manufacturing tolerances in
the warheads or true warhead-to-warhead variation in component sizes may also affect the results of the
template measurement, but estimates of such variations are not available in the open literature.
An additional concern regarding extrapolation to measurements at mA-scale beam currents is the
capability of the HPGe detectors to handle the event rate increase and the additional loss of live time to
pile-up events. While a 5 mA current will produce 200× as many bremsstrahlung photons relative to the
25 µA currents of the experiments described in this article, the rates in the HPGe detectors will increase
by a lesser factor. Realistic inspection objects will be larger than the mock warheads used for this work
and thus will prevent a greater fraction of the beam from reaching the encryption foil. Since the event
rate in the HPGe detectors is dominated by photons scattered from the foil, this attenuation reduces the
event rate in the detectors. To estimate the size of this effect the transmission of the bremsstrahlung beam
through the warhead test object to the encryption foil was simulated for two scenarios — the “template I”
mock warhead and the WGPu+DU “Black Sea” warhead model consisting of spherical shells of WGPu,
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FIG. S14. Summed spectra (points) and fits (curves) in the template II (black) vs hoax IId (red) verification
measurement.
high explosives, and a uranium tamper [40]. Fig. S15 shows the transmitted spectrum through each of
these objects per 1 µC of electron beam on target. The total transmitted photon rate through the mock
warhead is approximately 11 times higher than that of the more realistic Black Sea model, and the rate
at the high end of the spectrum (&2 MeV) is approximately 6 times higher for the mock warhead. Since
photons are more likely to eventually cause events in the detectors if they strike the foil at high energies,
the latter factor of ∼6 is taken as a conservative estimate of the rate reduction due to the thicker warhead.
Thus, the increase in the event rate in the detectors between the experiments described in this work and
a realistic warhead under inspection with a 5 mA electron beam current will be approximately 30. At
this rate, the dead time fraction due to pile-up events would be ∼60% while the increase in the fixed
event rate processing would result in a total dead time fraction of ∼90%. This corresponds to a live time
reduction of approximately an order of magnitude relative to the mock warhead experiments. This may
be mitigated in a future realistic verification scenario by increasing the number of detectors to directly
increase the live time, and in the future it is likely that HPGe detectors capable of operating at MHz-scale
rates will be available that would be more than sufficient for this application [26]. Additionally, the 5 mA
beam current assumption here is merely a starting point to provide a reference for estimated measurement
times and may be optimized to achieve a balance between detector rates and measurement times. As also
36
noted in the text, minimal effort was made to optimze the low-energy photon filters in front of the HPGe
detectors for this experiment and it is likely that further rate reductions could be achieved by optimized
shielding.
FIG. S15. Transmitted spectrum of the bremsstrahlung beam at the encryption foil for the template I mock warhead
and the Black Sea model warhead [40].
Appendix S5: Multi-line inference
The equation for the predicted NRF rates (Eq. S8 or its integrated form), contains multiple quantities
that are kept secret from the inspector, and thus cannot be used alone to infer the warhead thickness D
from a physically-encrypted spectrum. However, it is possible to develop a system of equations from
Eq. S8—one equation per NRF peak—in which case there may be at least as many equations as unknowns
and inference may be possible. This technique may be especially straightforward to realize by using two
NRF lines of the same isotope with similar resonance energies Er, such as the 2.176 MeV and 2.209 MeV
U-238 lines (if the latter were not obscured by the the 2.212 MeV Al-27 line) in any of the above NRF
spectra. Taking a ratio of Eq. S8 for the two lines allows one to cancel systematic factors such as the
int(E
′), Pf (E′), and number densities N , and to approximately cancel slowly varying functions of energy
E such as φ0(E) or perhaps even φt(E). If the φt(E) are canceled, the ratio of observed counts may then
be used to estimate the foil thickness X, which could in turn be used to estimate D; more complicated
procedures are required if only the φ0(E) are canceled. This information security question may be solved
37
by use of the encryption plates, which obscure the true value of D and permit inference only on some
upper bound D + ∆D.
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